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406 NEEL v. BARNARD [24 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 1845::J. In Bank. July 5, 1944.] 
THOlVIAS W. NEEL, as Executor, etc., et aI., Appellants,v. 
MORRIS H. BARNARD, as Executor, etc., et aI., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Trusts-Express Trusts-Oonveyance With Agreement to Re-
convey.-Where owners of property subject to foreclosurp 
under trust deeds enter into a written contract with otie of 
the creditors, in whom the owners repose great confidence, 
by which contract they transfer the property to said creditor 
to enable him to sell so much thereof as will liquidate their 
indebtedness and thereafter to reconvey to them the property 
remaining unsold, the contract is sufficient to create a vol~ 
untary trust and the creditor isa trustee and not a mortgagee 
in possession. 
[2] Id.-Express Trusts-Language of Instrument: Instruments 
Oreating.-No particular language or terminology is neces-
sary to create a trust; nor need the word "trust" or "trustee" 
be used. 
[3] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Liability Arising Out of Trusts. 
-Where an action pending against a defendant at the time 
of his death goes beyond an effort to follow and reclaim a 
specific fund or specific property, and asserts a general lia-
bility against him, to be satisfied out of the assets of his 
estate, arising out of a contract creating a voluntary trm;t 
Ilnd making the defendant a trustee, the action is subject to 
the provisions of Prob. Code, § 709, requiring the filing of a 
claim against his estate. 
[4] Id.-Claims-Actions-Proof-Variance.-Under Prob. Code, 
§ 709, the holder of a claim against a decedent's estate cannot 
maintain an action on any claim that he has not first presented 
for allowance, and in any action brought he can recover only 
on the claim which has been presented and rejected. The 
claimant's cause of action arises on the claim in the form 
in which it has been presented, and plaintiff is not permitted 
to prove a cause of action other than or different from that 
[2] See 25 Oa1.Jur. 286; 26 R.O.L. 1180, 1194. 
[3] See llA Oa1.Jur. 706, 711; 21 Am.Jur. 579. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 48;[2] Trusts, §§ 27, 29; 
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 476; [4] Decedents' Estates, § 570; 
[5] Decedents' Estates, § 490; [6,10] Trusts, § 255; [7] Trusts, 
§ 211; [8,12] Trusts, § 373 j [9] Trusts, § 377; [13] Trusts, 
§ 359 (7). 
\' 
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stated. in the claim, or to amend his complaint so as to sot 
up liny other cause of action. 
[5] Id.~Claims-Statemcnt of Claim.-A claim against a dece-
dent's estate must sufficiently indicate the nature and amount 
of the demand to enable the executor and probate judge to 
act advisedly upon it. A claim for an accounting and for 
damages for breach of duty as trustee does not cover a claim 
for a repudiation of the trust and a consequent liability of 
defendant's estate for the then value of the trust property. 
[6] Trusts-Liabilities of Trustee-On Oontracts.-Where prop-
erty is transferred to a trustee under a contract authorizing 
him to sell so much thereof as may be necessary to liquidate 
. the transferors' indebtedness, and conferring on him a large 
amount of discretion regarding the prices, terms and condi" 
tions of the sale, his mere failure to make a sale, even if 
the price is adequate, does not necessarily convict him of a 
brench of duty as trustee. 
[7] Id.--,-Oontrol of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Oourt. 
. -Where a. contract gives a .trustee the power to sell the 
trust property for such prices and such terms and conditions 
as he may deem proper, he is given an absolute discretion 
whose exercise cannot be reviewed or controlled by any other 
person or tribunal, on considerations going to the soundness 
of the judgment exercised by him, in the absence of fraud 
or bad faith. (See Civ. Code, § 2269.) 
[8] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an action against a 
trustee for failure to sell trust property under a contract 
conferring on him the power of sale, the evidence supportl:ld 
a finding that there was not an activo market for the disposal 
of said property, where conditions of depression during the 
time in question were well known. 
[9] Id.-Actions-Appeal-Presumptions.-In an action agAinst 
a trustee for failure to sell trust property under a contract 
conferring on him the power of sale, even if an offer for the 
property was made, it will be presumed on appeal that the 
trustee in the exercise of his judgment deemed the price too 
low, and the appellate court cannot say th.:tt he was guilty 
of fraud or bad faith in declining to sell. 
[10] Id. - Liabilities of Trustee - On Oontracts.-Even if the 
. proPerty transferred to a trustee, under a contract conferring 
on him the power of sale for purposes of liquidating the 
transferors' debts, could have been sold for enough to pay 
; the debts and leave a substantial surplus, the trustee's fail-
ure to sell would not necessarily convict him of bad faith 
or breach of duty, where it was not necessarily unreasonablo 
[4] See llA Oal.Jur. 865-867. 
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io~ hi~ to believe that the market would improve, and where 
there was no evidence that the transferors urged the trustee 
to close the property at the best prices obtainable or that 
they were not satisfied to rely on his judg-ment. Mistnken 
jUdgment is not necessarily unreasonable judgment, and 
neither is the equivalent of bad faith. 
[11] Id.-Actions-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-In an action 
against a trustee for failure to sell trust property under a 
contract conferring on him the power of sale, the issues of 
fraud and bad faith were questions for the determination 
of the trial court, and where its decision in favor of defendant 
has adequate support in the evidence, such decision will not 
be disturbed on appeal. 
[12] Id.-Actions-Evidence-Su1liciency.-In an action against 
a trustee for breach of duty with respect to real property, 
subject to trust deeds, which had been transferred to him 
under a contract authorizing him to sell the property, the 
evidence supported a finding that his acquisition of notes se-
cured by the trust deeds was done pursuant to the contract, 
where he had been a payee of notes secured by trust deeds 
of plaintiffs' land, and had sold them to others with his en-
dorsement, so that upon plaintiffs' default he could be com-
pelled by the holders to take them up, and where the motives 
. Inducing plaintiffs to execute the contract, as recited therein, 
were defendant's promise not to humiliate them by recording 
a notice of default under the trust deed securing the money 
which' he had advanced. . 
[13] Id.-Accounting by Trustee-Actions-Burden of Proof.-
On an accounting for a trust, the trustee has the burden to 
establish the correctness of his accounts. This rule goes 
merely to items in the accounts, and does not require the 
trustee to anticipate and defend against charges of derelic-
tion of duty and malfeasance which do not arise from any-
thing on the face of the accounts. Nor does the rule remove 
from a plaintiff the burden of proving charges of fraud and 
malfeasance against the trustee. 
. ,APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven-
tura County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge assigned. Affirmed. 
Action for an accounting, and for damages for breach of 
duty by a trustee. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Don G. Bowker, Henderson & Churchill and James C. 
Hollingsworth for Appellants. 
Rogers & Rogers, John H. Alvord, Newlin & Ashburn and 
A. W. Ashburn for Respondents. 
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THE COURT.-A petition for hearing in this case was 
gTanted to the end that further consideration be given to the 
'contentions of the appellants. On such consideration, we 
agree with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court 
of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division Three, 
and adopt as the opinion of this court the opinion of that 
court prepared by the Honorable Hartley Shaw, Justice pro 
tem. It is as follows: "This action was commenced by 
Henry H. Neel, Thomas W. Neel, his son, and Dessie L. Neel, 
wife of Thomas, against Chas. Barnard. After the action was 
begun, plaintiff Henry H. N eel and defendant Chas. Barnard 
died, the executors of their respective estates were substi-
tuted for them, and the executrix of the deceased wife of 
Barnard was also made a defendant. In discussing the case 
we shall use the terms 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' to refer 
to the original parties, except as otherwise specially stated. 
The present plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in favor of 
the present defendants. 
"This action arose from a contract between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant by Which, as plaintiffs claim and the trial 
court found, the defendant became a trustee for plaintifIs, 
and was based upon certain claimed breaches of duty by de-
fendant as such trustee. The contract consisted of a letter 
written by defendant to H. H. Neel and T. W. Neel, two of 
the plaintiffs, dated December 23, 1930, and a more formal 
agreement naming all the plaintifIs as parties of the first 
part and defendant as party of the second part, dated De-
cember 26, 1930, and signed by all of them. The letter trans~ 
mitted the agreement to plaintiffs and referred to it in such 
fashion as to make both, as the trial court found, parts of the 
one contract between the parties. Also a part of the trans-
action was a deed, dated December 26, 1930, by which the 
plaintifIs conveyed to defendant, without qualification or re~ 
striction of any sort, their real property hereinafter men-
tioned. 
"At and prior to the time of executing this contract plain-
tiffs were the owners of approximately 245 acres of valuable 
farming land in Ventura County, mostly used for the purpose 
of producing walnuts, with some of it in beans and other 
crops. Only 10 acres of this land were owned by plaintifIs 
Thomas W. Neel and Dessie L. Neel, the balance being the 
property of plaintifI Henry H. Neel, who was a widower. 
410 NEEL v. BARNARD [24 C.2d 
At the time of this transaction this land was subject to trust 
deeds for money loaned to the plaintiffs, a large part of it 
by the defendant but some of it by others, amounting, with 
advances a1'30 secured by the trust deeds, to $228,260.92, as 
of March 31, 1931, according- to the recitals of the agreement 
above mentioned, which projected the balances to include 
interest to that date. Payment of this sum and interest 
thereon was in default, in part, the trust deeds were subject 
to foreclosure, and plaintiffs were looking for some mode of 
refinancing their debts or otherwise saving themselves from 
the complete loss of their property which seemed impending. 
"The letter and agreement above mentioned recited the 
facts regarding the loans, the incumbrances and the default 
in all the detail necessary to a complete statement, provided 
for the execution of the deed above referred to, and declared 
that plaintiffs had received no consideration for the deed. 
By the agreement tbe plaintiffs gave the defendant 'full au-
thority and power irrevocable to sell, lease or otherwise dis-
pose of any part of or all of said real property, or any in-
terest or estate therein, in such pieces or parcels, and for 
such prices and upon such terms and conditions as the pJl'ty 
of the second part may deem proper, and to enter into con-
tracts, and execute all papers as may be proper or necessary 
in order to carry out and consummate said sale or sales, and 
upon receipt of the purchase price, either in cash or part of 
the purchase price in cash and the payment of the remainder 
to be secured by a mortgage or deed of trust upon the prop-
erty so sold, to execute and deliver to the respective pur-
chaser all necessary and proper contracts, bonds and deeds 
of conveyance for the lands so sold which are or may be 
necessary or proper to fully carry out and complete the trans-
fer of the property so sold and to be in such form and under 
such conditions as the party of the second part may deem 
proper. ' Plaintiffs also authorized the sale of personal prop-
erty used on the realty and of water stock appurtenant to it. 
In the agreement plaintiffs stated their 'confidence and trust 
in the integ-rity and honesty' of defendant and their belief, 
by reason thereof, that 'the disposition and sale of said rcal 
property and the payment of their indebtedness .' .. can be 
more expeditiously accomplished, at less cost, expense and 
for a greater value than can possibly be made' on a fore-
closure sale and that the proceeds of sale will probably be in 
\ 
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excess of the debts 'if the management and sale of said real 
property is intrusted to' defendant. The defendant agreed 
'that when the proceeds from the sale of said real property is 
ample and sufficient to pay the indebtedness herein described, 
and the advances, costs and expenses in the care and manage-
ment of said real property, he will then make a full report 
and accounting" to the plaintiffs 'of all the receipts and dis-
bursements made and upon approval and accepta.nce of said 
report' the defendant will reconvey to plaintiffs 'all the real 
property remaining unsold, if any; ... and upon acceptance 
and approval of said final report ... he shall be released 
and discharged from all confidence created by the acceptance 
of said grant to said real property.' Another term of the 
agreement was that the proceeds of sales and the income' from 
the property 'shall be applied to the payment of the indebt-
edness herein described, the interest to accrue thereon, and 
the disbursements made by ... [defendant] in the care and 
management of said real property, and for no other purpose.' 
It was also agreed that defendant was to receive compensation 
for his services. Pursuant to this contract defendant took 
possession -of the property described in it and has held and 
operated that property ever since, except two parcels which 
he sold. 
[1] "Defendant contends that this agreement did not 
create a trust, but merely made of defendant a mortgagee in 
possession. The trial court, however, treated defendant as a 
trustee and we are satisfied that this view of the matter is 
correct. It is true the defendant, in his letter, referred to 
the fact that the deed was without limitation or qualification, 
saying also 'I decline to enter into any trust agreement, or 
declaration of trust'; but in this respect he was like Byron's 
maid who 'whispering "she would ne'er consent," consented.' 
The defendant was not even named as the lender and bene-
ficiary in some of the trust deeds recited in the agreement, 
and many of the notes originally made to him as payee had 
at the date of the agreement been transferred to others. The 
powers given him by the contract far exceeded those of a 
mortgagee in possession. The relationship created by the 
contract has all the earmarks of a voluntary trust and must 
be so regarded. There is a transfer of property by plain~ 
tiffs to defendant, motivated by their personal confidence re, 
posed in him, for the purpose of enabling him to carry out 
412 NEEL v. BARNARD [24 C.2d 
certain purposes for the benefit of plaintiffs as well as the 
holders of the indebtedness, which is voluntarily accepted by 
defendant, and he assumes an obligation to carry out these 
purposes, subject of course to the discretion provided for in 
the agreement; all in writing. T1;J.is is sufficient to create a 
voluntary trust and make defendant a trustee. (Civ. Code, 
§§ 852, 2216, 2219, 2221, 2222.) [2] No particular lan-
guage or terminology is necessary to create a trust; nor need 
the word 'trust' or 'trustee' be used. (Weiner v. Mullaney 
(1943), 59 Cal.App.2d 620, 631 [140 P.2d 704].) 
"Many of the points made by appellants are based upon 
the claim, which permeates their briefs, that the defendant, 
a short time after the trust was created, repudiated and aban-
doned it, claimed the trust property as his own and from 
that time forward treated the property as if there were no 
trust and the conveyance to him had been absolute, the plain-
tiffs further asserting that by such conduct defendant com-
mitted a conversion of the trust property and must be charged 
with the value of the propery as of the date of repudiation. 
In reply the respondents contend that this claim of appel-
lants is not within the scope of the complaint filed by plain-
tiffs or of the claim presented to the estate of the original 
defendant. These two points merge into one, for when, by 
reason of the death of the original defendant before the trial, 
it became necessary to file a claim against his estate (Prob. 
Code, § 709) the claim filed was simply a copy of the plain-
tiffs' complaint herein. There is no room here for the appli-
cation of the rule that prevails where an issue not made by 
the pleading is tried by consent, even if that rule could be 
applied to a variance from the claim filed, for. defendant 
made timely objection to the evidence on which appellants 
found their contentions in this matter. 
"The complaint contained two statements of causes of ac-
tion. The first alleged the creation of the trust, stating the 
surrounding circumstances including defendant's superior 
knowledge and skill in the management and sale of property 
such as that of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' great trust and con~ 
fidence in defendant, setting forth copies of defendant's letter 
and of plaintiffs' deed to him and giving what the plaintiffs 
understood to be the legal effect of the agreement, a copy of 
which they alleged they had been unable to find. This stated 
,leM"Yw~ckf1f f.!1~ of'~e details of the actual 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 1 \' 
25 TAYLOR ST. <S~ 4·8054 
SAN FRANCISCO 2, CA' 'F" .. 
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agreement, did not differ from it in any respect material to 
the present inquiry. This count also alleged that defendant 
had made two sales of described portions of the land plain-
tiffs had conveyed to him, and that he had received income, 
rents and profits from the land conveyed to him which were 
in excess of the costs of operation, that he had failed and 
refused to render an account and plaintiffs had demanded 
one. This count further alleged that defendant became trus-
tee for the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs had done everything re~ 
quired of them by the contract, and that defendant had 
'failed, refused and neglected to properly perform and dis-
charge his duties as trustee, in that' he had failed and re-
fused to account. ' 
"The second statement of a cause of action began by in-
corporating the first. Then it alleged that by the contract 
between the parties it was agreed that defendant would 'dili~ 
gently and expeditiously sell so much of said ... properties 
as would liquidate and satisfy the said indebtedness then 
owed by the plaintiffs; that by reason thereof it was the duty 
and obligation of the said Chas. Barnard to sell transfer and 
dispose of so much of said real properties within a reason-
able time as would liquidate said indebtedness; that there 
was at said time an active market for the disposal of said 
real property, and at such prices as would have liquidated 
said indebtedness then owed by plaintiffs and which would 
have left a balance either in money or property for the plain-
tiffs of approximately two hundred thousand dollars.' Then 
followed allegations that defendant had at various times not 
stated received bona fide offers from cash buyers for various 
parts of the property, which would have enabled defendant 
to sell the entire property for more than $400,000, but he 
'refused to sell, transfer and dispose of certain parcels of 
said . . . properties' and if he had sold them plaintiffs 
'would have been restored to the occupation and possession 
of certain parcels of said real properties and would have 
received the rents, issues, incomes and profits therefrom, and 
all to plaintiffs' damage in the sum of two hundred thou-
sand dollars.' The second count then alleged facts regarding 
each sale made by defendant, showing that in each case the 
sale had been made for much less than the market value, to 
plaintiffs' damage in. the aggregate sum of $37,619.28. 
Finally, it alleged that 'by reason of 'the£ailure, refusal and 
414 NEEL V. BARNARD [24 C.2d 
neglect on the part of said Ohas. Barnard to sell and dispose 
of Raid real properties within a reasonable time after taking 
the record title thereto,' interest on plaintiffs' indebtedness 
had accumulated and increased in the sum of $100,000, but 
if he had made sales within a reasonable time $85,000 would 
have been credited thereon, to their further damage in the 
:;um of $85,000. Prayer was for an accounting, that upon 
the accounting defendant be required 'to pay, convey and 
deliver to said plaintiffs property cash that may be due them,' 
and for damages in the sum of $322,619.28. 
[3] "The action, as characterized by the complaint, goes 
far beyond an effort to follow and reclaim a specific fund or 
specific property. It asserts a general liability against de-
fendant, to he satisfied out of the assets of his estate, what-
ever they may be, and arising out of the contract pleaded. 
It is therefore subject to the provisions of Probate Code, 
section 709, requiring the filing of a claim where an action 
is pending at the time of a decedent's death. (See llA Cal. 
Jur. 706, 711, 712.) This conclusion is even more obvious 
as applied to appellants' theory of a repudiation of the trust, 
leading to a liability for the value of the property, for this 
theory involves an abandonment of the property by plaintiffs. 
"Neither of the causes of action stated in the complaint 
constituting plaintiffs' claim said anything of a repudiation 
of the trust. The first was solely and simply an action to 
obtain an accounting. The second added to the first four 
items of damage which plaintiffs sought to recover j that is, 
$200,000 arising from defendant's failure and refusal to sell 
the property for enough to liquidate plaintiffs' indebtedness 
and leave them a balance of $200,000; $6,619.28 and $31,000 
caused by defendant's sales of two properties for less than 
their value; and $85,000 for interest, which accrued on plain-
tiffs' debts by reason of defendant's delay in selling. We 
cannot see how any of these allegations even hints at, or can 
be regarded by any sort of implication as including, a re-
pudiation of the trust by defendant, with concomitant claim 
to hold the property in his own right, free of any trust. 
[4] "'The provision that the holder of a claim against an 
estate cannot maintain an action thereon unless the claim is 
first presented is equivalent to a declaration that !te cannot 
'maintain an action upon any claim that he has not first pre-
sented for allowance, and that in any action brought he can 
\ 
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recover only upon the claim which has been presented and 
rejected. This rule is settled by a long line of decisions. Tho 
claim as presented and passed upon is the foundation of the 
cause of action. The claimant's cause of action arises upon 
the claim in the form in which it has been presented; that is 
the only action he may maintain, and plaintiff is not per-
mitted to prove a cause of action other than or different 
from that stated in the claim, or to amend his complaint so. 
as to set up any other cause of action;' (llA Cal.Jur. 865~ 
867; to same effect see cases cited in notes to Cal.Jur.) 
[5] A claim must 'sufficiently indicate the nature and 
amount of the demand to enable the executor and judge in 
probate to act advi:sedly upon it.' (Thompson v. Koeller 
[1920], 183 Cal. 476, 485 [191 P. 927].) Applying these 
rules to the present case, we conclude that the plaintiffs' 
claim as filed did not cover their present claim of a repudi.a-
tion of' the trust and a consequent liability of defendant's 
estate for the then value of the trust property. There was 
nothing in it to suggest that any such liability was to be as-
serted, and the executor was therefore not put in a position 
to act advisedly upon the claim as now made. For this reason 
we dismiss the claim of repudiation from our attention in 
giving further consideration to the appeal. 
"The complaint and the claim do, however, clearly pre-
sent the point that it was the duty of defendant to sell, the 
trust property, or so much of it as was necessary, in a rea-
sonable time, that he failed to do so, and that by reason of 
such failure the plaintiffs suffered damage. The trial court 
put' a construction on the contract which contravenes plain-
tiffs' contention, in this finding: 'That it was not the duty 
or obligation of Chas. Barnard to sell, transfer and dispose; 
of so much of the real property involved herein within a 
reasonable time as would liquidate said indebtedness, but 
that it was his duty to offer said properties for sale at what 
he deemed a reasonable and fair price in an endeavor and 
an attempt to liquidate said indebtedness within a reasonable. 
time and have a substantial sum left over to pay to the Neels, 
or in case of a liquidation by sale of a part of the property, 
to return the remaining properties to the plaintiffs.' We· 
shall not undertake to decide whether the construction thus, 
put on the contract in regard to defendant's duty to sell, 
within a reasonable time is correct; for assuming :plaintiffs' 
416 NEEL v. BARNARD t240.M 
construction to b3 the true one, that is, that it was the de-
fendant's duty to make sufficient sales within a reasonable 
time to liquidate plaintiffs' indebtedness, other findings and 
other terms of the contract are such that an error in the 
finding just quoted would not lead to a reversal. 
[6] "Much of plaintiffs' argument on this point is based 
on the further finding that the defendant had 'an oppor-
tunity to sell the 89 acre tract (part of the land conveyed to 
defendant by plaintiffs) for a net sum of $133,000 (the offer 
of $140,000 being subject to a 5 per cent real estate commis-
sion) which offer was made in January of 1931, and which 
was refused . . .' This is coupled with the further finding 
that 'at said time and place defendant offered to sell said 
property to the same person for $150,000 cash, which offer 
was likewise refused. That said offers and refusals were not 
made in violation of the terms of the contract, but in the 
exercise of an honest judgment and discretion made and exer-
cised in good faith.' The contract, while it may have required 
a sale within a reasonable time, conferred a large amount of 
discretion on the defendant regarding the prices, terms and 
conditions of sale. The question, what was a reasonable time, 
is inextricably bound up with his exercise of discretion in 
these matters, and the time might vary accordingly. De-
fendant's mere failure to make a sale, even if, as plaintiffs 
contend was the case here, the price was adequate, as viewed 
from the standpoint of the present and the information on 
market conditions and trends now available, does not neces-
sarily convict him of a breach of duty as trustee, for his 
discretion would properly take other matters into consider-
ation. 
[7] "By the formal agreement defendant is given power 
to sell the land 'in such pieces or parcels, and for such prices 
and upon such terms and conditions as the party of the sec-
ond part [defendant] may deem proper,' and in the letter de-
fendant stated 'I must have the total and absolute control of 
the entire property as to its care, management, recital [so 
reads the record; per ha ps 'rental' is in tended] and sale or 
as to the disposition of the proceeds from the income or the 
proceeds or as to the disposition of the proceeds from a sale, 
and certainly there must be no restriction as to a sale and 
conveyance under such terms and conditions, as I may deem 
proper for as to those matters, I am to be the sole judge.' 
\ 
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By these provisions the defendant is given an absolute dis-
cretion, whose exercise cannot be reviewed or controlled by 
any other person or tribunal on consideration going to the 
soundness of the judgment exercised by him. (Civ.· Code, 
§ 2269.) No doubt his exercise of this discretion could be 
attacked for fraud or bad faith, but we discover no evidence 
which requires a finding of fraud or bad faith, contrary to 
the trial court's finding of good faith, in regard to the offer 
mentioned in the finding above quoted. This offer was made 
in January, 1931, within a month of the execution of the 
contract between plaintiffs and defendant. There is evidence' 
that real estate values in the vicinity of this land dropped 
greatly in the latter part of 1931 and thereafter, but we find 
nothing to show defendant was not exercising an honest judg-
ment when he refused the price offered him in January of 
that year. 
[8] "Concerning the later failure of defendant to sell, 
the court found' That it is untrue that on or about December· 
26, 1930, or at any time thereafter, there was an active mar-
ket for the disposal of said real property, but it is true that 
there were only occasional sales of like properties, similarly 
situated, and that there was not an active market for said 
properties at any time subsequent to December 26, 1930, and 
it is untrue that the defendants had an opportunity to sell 
any or all of said properties at such price as would have 
liquidated the indebtedness owed by plaintiffs to defendants 
and which would have left a balance either in money or 
property of plaintiffs of approximately $200,000.00 or any 
other sums. That the two sales made by plaintiff were made 
in the due course of business and were the only ones which 
could have been made other than an opportunity to sell the 
89 acre tract ... ' (here follows the finding already quoted 
regarding this offer). Upon examining the evidence we see 
therein sufficient support for this finding, which it seems un-
necessary to set forth here, to the mere lengthening of this 
opinion. Conditions of depression during the time in ques~ 
tion are so well known that little proof of them is necessary. 
This finding while it does not directly pass upon the question 
of reasonable time, does in effect dispose of it; for if the 
property could not have been sold, on such terms as defend-
ant properly determined, a reasonable time for sale had not 
24 C.2d-14 
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elapsed. Plaintiffs point to a letter of defendant written in 
January, 1931, stating that he had declined an offer for a 24 
acre tract. No details of this offer appear except the price, 
and as to that the letter stated that defendant was holding 
the land for a higher price. Evidently the trial court did not 
accept this admission as proving the fact admitted, for it 
found that no such sale could have been made. The trial 
court was not bound to accept such an admission as conclu-
sive of the fact, even though it was not directly contradicted. 
[9] But even if the offer was made, it is to be presumed that 
defendant exercised his judgment upon it and deemed the 
price too low, and we cannot say he was guilty of fraud or 
bad faith in declining to sell. 
[10] "Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the properties could 
have been sold for enough to pay the debts and leave a sub-
stantial surplus, defendant's failure to sell would not neces-
sarily convict him of bad faith or breach of duty. It was not 
necessarily unreasonable for him to believe that the market 
would improve, and the court may well have concluded that 
plaintiffs shared that belief. There was no evidence that 
plaintiffs ever urged defendant to close the properties out at 
the best prices obtainable or that they were not satisfied to 
rely upon his judgment. It is true that they had no right to 
control defendant's action, but the fact that they made no 
protest against his failure to make sales indicates that they 
did not then question either his good faith or his good judg-
ment. Furthermore, mistaken judgment is not necessarily 
unreasonable judgment and of course neither is the equiva-
lent of bad faith. 
[11] "In regard to this issue of fraud and bad faith, 
which is raised as to all of defendant's acts in accepting and 
carrying out the trust, and particularly as against the court's 
finding 'That it is untrue that the defendant, Chas. Barnard, 
acting as trustee or otherwise under the contract herein, has 
failed, refused and neglected, or failed, refused or neglected, 
to properly perform and discharge his duty as trustee,' there 
are circumstances pointed out by plaintiffs which tend to cast 
some doubt on defendant's complete bona fides, and if the 
trial court had made findings in plaintiffs' favor on this 
issue, perhaps they could have been sustained. But on a con-
sideration of all these matters and of the evidence as a whole 
we are of the opinion that the question was one for resolu-
\ 
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tion by the trial court and that its decision in favor of de-
fendant has adequate support in the evidence and cannot be 
disturbed by us. The record is so voluminous and consists so 
largely of documentary matter that it would unduly prolong 
this opinion to set forth even a synopsis of the evidence on 
this point; we have, however, considered everything to which 
our attention is directed by the parties, with the result al-
ready stated. 
[12] "Complaint is made that defendant was guilty of a 
breach of trust because he acquired the notes secured by the 
various trust deeds incumbering the property deeded to him, 
this being called the acquiring of an interest adverse to the 
trust, which is prohibited by section 2233 of the Civil Code. 
The trial court found that this was done 'pursuant to the 
contract' between the parties, and we think this finding is 
supported. Defendant had been the payee of notes amount-
ing to $160,000 and secured by trust deeds of plaintiffs' land, 
and had sold them to others with his endorsement, so that 
upon the defa:ult which is recited in the contract he could be 
compelled by the holders to take them up. The motives in-
ducing plaintiffs to execute the contract, as expressly recited 
in the formal agreement, were the promise of defendant not 
to humiliate or embarrass them by recording a notice of de-
fault under the trust deed securing the money he had ad-
vanced and their expectation that the proceeds of sales by 
defendant would probably be greater than could be obtained 
at foreclosure sales and greater than the amount required to 
pay their indebtedness. The agreement also mentions dii:;-
bursements to be made by defendant in the care and man'age~ 
ment of the property. The defendant's letter transmitting 
the agreement stated that' all my future investments will be 
for the care and protection of the property' and that 'it will 
be necessary to invest much additional capital before we can 
complete the entire matter.' If defendant was to avoi.d the 
recording of a· notice of default on the trust deed running 
to himself, he must, of necessity, obtain the notes secured by 
it; and the purchase of notes secured by other trust deeds 
would be advisable and perhaps necessary to avoId the fore-
closure sales, in accordance with the purpose of the contract. 
[13] ,. Plaintiffs further complain that defendant should 
have been required to assume the burden of proof on the ac~ 
counting. At the trial defendant presented an accoUnt and 
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produced evidence in support of the items contained in it, 
such as tended to show that the items of reccipts and dis-
bursements were correct in amount and that the disburse-
ments claimed were for proper purposes, and on this evidence 
the court made and stated in its findings a complete account, 
which differed in some respects from that submitted by de-
fendant. Plaintiffs' point here is not, as we understand it, 
directed at the proceedings on the account so stated and does 
not involve the claim that evidence is lacking to support the 
findings as to the items included by the court in its account. 
The contention is, rather, that the defendant should have 
been required to jUfltify affirmatively his failure to make 
~;ales of the trust property. On an accounting for a trust, the 
trustee does have a burden to 8stablish the correctness of his 
accounts, but the rule does not go so far as plaintiffs claim. 
Thcir main reliance in support of the claim is Purdy v. J ohn-
son (1917), 174 Cal. 521, 527 [163 P. 893]. That was an 
action against trustees for an accounting and other appro-
priate relief. The trustees presented an account to the court. 
and were cross-examined by the plaintiffs there in regard to 
the items in it, but apparently produced no evidence in its 
support. Of this procedure the court said: 'We think the 
course pursued was irregular . . . The entire trial was con-
ducted upon the erroneous theory that the burden of proof 
was upon the beneficiary to point out the particulars in which 
the account was erroneous, and that she was bound to go for-
ward and establish affirmatively the impropriety of the 
charges and credits which she assailed. Such is not the law 
... in fact, the burden is upon the trustees to prove that 
charges made by them are proper.' As a final statement of 
the rule in this respect the court declared, at page 531, 'that 
it is the duty of the trustees to support every item of their 
account, and that wherever they fail to support the correct-
ness of a charge or credit by satisfactory evidence, the item 
mw;t be disallowed.' All of this the defendant here did. This 
rule goes merely to items in the account. It does not require 
the trustee to anticipate and defend against charges of dere-
liction of duty and malfeasance which do not arise from any-
thing on the face of his accounts but are grounded on other 
matters. It does not remove from a plaintiff who sues a 
trustee on charges of fraud and malfeasance the burden, 
which the law would cast on him in case of another defend-
\ 
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ant, of proving his charges. The trustee is entitled to the 
benefit of the presumptions of regularity and good faith. 
(See Estate of Vance [1940], 141 Cal. 624, 626 [75 P. 323] ; 
B'urke v. Maguire [1908], 154 Cal. 456, 468 [98 P. 21].) 
"Many other points are made and argued in the 762 pages 
of briefs filed herein, but they relate to the contention that 
there was a repUdiation of the trust and to the weight of the 
evidence and a discussion of them here is not deemed neces-
sary in a disposition of this appeal." 
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. 
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CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, Respond-
ent, v. LOS ANGELES DOWN TOWN SHOPPING 
NEWS CORPORATION (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Independent Contractors-Definition.-An independent con-
tractor is a person who is engaged in an independent em-
ployment or occupation, responsible to his principal only for 
the result and not for the manner or means by which it is 
accomplished. 
[2] ld.-Existence of Relationship-Control of Means of Work.-
In determining whether an individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor, the most important factor is the right 
to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result 
desired. If the employer has the power to exercise complete: 
control, an employer-employee relationship exists, whether or 
not that potential control is exercised with respect to all 
details. 
[3] ld.-Existence of Relationship-Right to Discharge Workmen. 
-The right to discharge an employee at will, without cause, 
is strong evidence of the employer's control. 
[4] Unemployment Relief-Employment-Right of Control.-In 
an action against the publisher of an advertising sheet for 
[1] See 13 Cal.Jur. 1014; 27 Am.Jur. 481. 
[4] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Parts) "Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Independent Contractors, § 1; 
[2] Independent Contractors, § 3; [3] Independent Contractors, 
§ 5; [4-6] Unemployment Relief. 
